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H
ow do credit unions set deposit rates? As
we will show, the answer to this question
depends on (i) who actually makes busi-
ness decisions in credit unions (who is in control),
and (ii) whether local deposit market conditions
are important. Although members legally control
all credit unions, an occupational credit union
requires a sponsor (i.e., an employer) that could
withdraw its support from the credit union or
apply pressure on members if the sponsor’s inter-
ests were not being served. Thus, the question of
who effectively controls an occupational credit
union is an empirical question.
If members effectively control an occupational
credit union, then the array of services offered
and the pricing of these services may be skewed
toward the interests of a subset of members. This
is because, in a one-member, one-vote governance
system, there is a strong “winner-takes-all” incen-
tive to gain (and exploit) control. Conversely, if the
credit union’s sponsor (i.e., the employer) controls
the institution, then there is likely to be a more
balanced distribution of surplus to all members.
This is because employers sponsor occupational
credit unions to maximize the total surplus the
credit union creates for all employees rather than
to maximize the surplus for a particular group of
employees. Finally, if local deposit-market compe-
tition tends to constrain rate-setting behavior, then
the credit union’s membership structure shouldn’t
matter at all in the determination of deposit rates.
This paper explores the member-control, the
sponsor-control, and the market-control hypothe-
ses and then tests a key prediction made by each.
The test is motivated by our theoretical examina-
tion of the pricing of deposits that would be
expected under each of the three regimes.
Because we present a simple model in which
there is no risk, we restrict our empirical analysis
to deposit rates. An examination of loan rates, by
way of contrast, would require controls for the
riskiness of individual borrowers and is rife with
complications that would only obscure our simple
objective. Furthermore, we assume that each cred-
it union member is either a borrower or a deposi-
tor but not both (again, for simplicity).
We hypothesize that, if depositors are in con-
trol, they will maximize their own surplus by set-
ting high deposit and loan rates, taking into
account local market conditions that constrain
their actions.
1 We will show that the larger the
majority that depositors enjoy, the lower deposit
rates should be. This is because the number of
members that the depositors are able to “exploit”
is lower. Thus, we expect a positive relationship
between the borrower-to-member ratio and
deposit rates, conditional on depositor control of
the credit union. We also expect that the loan rate
in this regime is independent of the membership
distribution, corresponding to the familiar text-
book monopoly case for constant marginal costs.
If borrowers are in control, on the other hand,
we hypothesize that the credit union chooses rela-
tively low deposit and loan rates to maximize the
surplus of borrowers, taking due account of local
market conditions. In this regime, the deposit rate
is independent of the number of borrowers in the
membership, corresponding to the textbook
“monopsony” result (monopoly of the buyer,
rather than the seller). Meanwhile, a higher num-
ber of borrowers implies a higher loan rate,
because the number of “exploitable” members is
lower.
In summary, the member-control hypothesis
implies that, as we examine the membership
structure of credit unions in cross-section, deposit
rates will rise as the number of borrowers in the
membership rises as long as the borrowers are in
the minority. Once the majority changes from
depositors to borrowers, the deposit rate drops
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and remains at a low level, independent of how
big the borrower majority is.
The sponsor-control hypothesis of occupation-
al credit unions, by way of contrast, presumes that
the welfare of each member is weighted equally.
The only reason why deposit rates would be asso-
ciated with the membership structure in a given
credit union would be if deposits were an impor-
tant marginal source of loanable funds. That is, by
virtue of having a high number of borrowers, a
credit union would have high loan demand. This
higher demand would be met by attracting addi-
tional deposit funds from members (existing or
new). To do this, a credit union would need to
offer higher deposit rates. Thus, when examining
the cross-section of occupational credit unions,
deposit rates would be higher for credit unions
with a high proportion of borrowers in the mem-
bership.
Finally, the market-control hypothesis
describes a situation in which local deposit-
market competition constrains credit union rate-
setting behavior completely. In other words, no
single credit union could set its own deposit rates
below local deposit rates without suffering a
deposit outflow. Likewise, it could not set rates
above the local market without attracting a huge
and unusable deposit inflow (limited by its poten-
tial membership, of course). The important point
for our purposes is that local market competition,
rather than the credit union’s number of borrow-
ers or lenders in the membership, would dictate
rate-setting behavior.
We analyze a large sample of occupational
credit unions that reported financial results at the
end of 1997. We characterize the membership dis-
tribution by calculating the ratio of the number of
loans to the number of members. Our assumption
is that this ratio can serve as a proxy for the num-
ber of borrowers in the membership. Our sample
contains some occupational credit unions with rel-
atively low loan-to-member ratios, which is con-
sistent with depositor majorities. It also contains
observations with loan-to-member ratios so high
that borrower majorities can be assumed. We find
that observed deposit rates are positively associat-
ed with the loan-to-member ratio over virtually
the entire range of loan-to-member ratios. This
result is consistent with the sponsor-control
hypothesis of occupational credit unions but is
inconsistent with both the member-control and
the market-control hypotheses.
BACKGROUND AND RESEARCH ON
OCCUPATIONAL CREDIT UNIONS
Credit unions numbered 11,392 at year-end
1996, serving some 70 million individual mem-
bers (U.S. Treasury, 1997, p. 15). Credit-union
assets were $327 billion, compared with $5,606
billion held by commercial banks and thrifts (U.S.
Treasury, 1997, p. 21). Of the 7,068 federally char-
tered institutions at year-end 1996, about three
fourths were occupational credit unions (U.S.
Treasury, 1997, p. 19).2 One or more firms spon-
sor each occupational credit union, sometimes
providing office space, paid time off for volunteer
workers, and other forms of support. The remain-
ing federal credit unions are as follows: (i) single-
group credit unions of the associational or com-
munity type, or (ii) multiple-group credit unions
with predominantly associational, community, or
more than one type of membership (i.e., several
types of membership groups that span the usual
classifications). According to a credit union survey
in 1987, 79 percent of all Americans who were eli-
gible to join a credit union had done so (American
Bankers Association, 1989, p. 29). Given the
prominent role of occupational credit unions, a
majority of members are in the prime working
ages of 25 to 44 (American Bankers Association,
1989, p. 30).
Most members of occupational credit unions
easily could (and often do) obtain financial servic-
es from a for-profit financial intermediary such as
a commercial bank or a thrift institution. Why
then do so many employers sponsor credit
unions? Hansmann (1996) suggests that occupa-
tional credit unions continue to thrive today
because employers (sponsors) benefit from them:
Employers can also benefit from having a
credit union for their employees. The
credit union ties the employees more
tightly to the employer, improves the
employees’ financial situation (and conse-
quently their effective wage), and helps
keep the employees out of financial diffi-
culties that may interfere with their work
or create bother for the employer (such as
garnishment of wages). For these reasons
2 We concentrate on federally chartered credit unions because the
National Credit Union Association does not vouch for the accuracy
of data provided by state-chartered credit unions, which report
directly to their state's regulatory authorities.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST.L OUIS
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employers have often helped promote the
formation of credit unions, for example, by
providing free office space and free time
off to the employees who administer
them. (Hansmann, 1996, pp. 259-60)
Most credit union sponsors are in non-
financial businesses, so they may not be well-
suited—or particularly eager—to operate a finan-
cial institution. At the same time, credit unions are
legally governed by their members on a one-
member, one-vote basis. Do the members there-
fore control occupational credit unions? Or do
local market conditions dictate many of the busi-
ness decisions an occupational credit union must
make, such as setting deposit rates?
The possibility of member control is important
because there may be (roughly speaking) two dis-
tinct types of members: those whose primary rea-
son for joining the credit union is to borrow
money and those whose primary reason for join-
ing is to save in the form of insured deposits. If
members (or member coalitions) effectively con-
trol occupational credit unions, then the relative
size of the two groups of members determines
how deposit and loan terms are set. Gaining effec-
tive control of the credit union would allow one
group or the other to skew the credit union’s
terms in their own favor.
The question of who controls cooperative
financial institutions, such as occupational credit
unions, is an old one (Taylor, 1971; Flannery, 1974;
Smith, Cargill, and Meyer, 1981; Smith, 1984; Hart
and Moore, 1996, 1998; Emmons and Mueller,
1997; Emmons and Schmid, 1999a, 2000b). Most
studies of this type assume that one group of
members, such as depositors or borrowers, con-
trols the cooperative firm. Empirical evidence
about credit unions is mixed; some studies find
depositor domination and others find borrower
domination. Emmons and Schmid (1999a) offer an
exception to the usual approach that members
control the cooperative financial institution. They
assume the sponsor exercises control. This study
revisits this question in an attempt to find evi-
dence consistent with the member-control, the
sponsor-control, or the market-control hypothesis.
A MODEL OF CONTROL IN
OCCUPATIONAL CREDIT UNIONS
We examine a simple credit union that gener-
ates surplus for its members by presenting oppor-
tunities to borrow and to deposit funds in an
insured account. The supply and demand func-
tions are reduced-form equations that result from
household optimization subject to the local
deposit-market conditions. To keep the model sim-
ple, we do not explicitly model these household
decisions but instead postulate the existence of
demand and supply functions.
We present three (mutually exclusive)
hypotheses regarding effective control of an occu-
pational credit union: (i) the member-control
hypothesis, under which a controlling group of
members sets deposit and loan rates to maximize
its own surplus, (ii) the sponsor-control hypothe-
sis, under which the sponsoring firm sets deposit
and loan rates to maximize the total surplus for all
members, and (iii) the market-control hypothesis,
under which local deposit-market competition dic-
tates the rates every credit union sets.
In our model, all potential credit-union mem-
bers are identical except that some are borrowers
while others are depositors.3 We assume that the
number of loans is proportional to the number of
borrowers, and likewise for depositors. More
specifically, we assume that each borrowing mem-
ber wants one loan and responds to changes in
the loan rate by adjusting the size of the loan.4
The aggregated demand curve for loans and the
aggregated supply curve of deposits are obtained
by adding up the individual quantities for each
price (loan rate and deposit rate, respectively) for
each credit union. We analyze aggregated demand
and supply curves to derive hypotheses about
optimal rate-setting under the three control
regimes analyzed here.
We assume the credit union operates under a
zero-profit constraint, given its not-for-profit char-
acter. The credit union can lend or borrow in the
interbank market at the same rate, r. For simplici-
ty, we assume that the demand for loans and the
supply of deposits are both linear in the borrowing
and the deposit rates, respectively. In indirect
form, the loan-demand and deposit-supply sched-
ules facing the credit union are as follows:
3 Assuming identical potential members implies that all potential
members are also actual members (or the credit union would not
have formed). See Emmons and Schmid (1999b, 2000a) for models
with endogenous membership decisions.
4 The specific proportionality assumption—that each borrower takes
out one loan—allows us to use the ratio of loans to members as a
proxy for the number of borrowers in the credit union’s member-
ship in the empirical section of the article.(1a)
(1b) 
where p and q denote the loan rate and the
deposit rate, respectively; x and y are the dollar
amounts of loans made and deposits accepted by
the bank, respectively; and a, b, c, and d are fixed
parameters reflecting member preferences. In par-
ticular, we assume that the maximum loan rate
the borrowers are willing to pay, a, exceeds the
interbank rate, r. Likewise, the minimum deposit
rate the depositors are willing to accept, c, is
below the interbank rate, r. The parameters b and
d reflect the sensitivities of the loan demand and
deposit supply to the credit union’s deposit and
loan rates, respectively. For simplicity, we assume
the credit union has no operating costs. This does
not affect the results qualitatively and simplifies
the analysis.
Sponsor Control
Sponsor control implies that the objective of
an occupational credit union is to maximize the
surplus enjoyed by all members. Figure 1 shows
that a sponsor-controlled credit union optimally
equates the deposit and loan rates at the level dic-
tated by the intersection of members’ demand and
supply curves. This result follows from the basic
principles of welfare economics. The surplus of
borrowers is the area under the demand curve and
above the optimal loan rate, p0 (triangle ECD).
Intuitively, the surplus equals the difference
between the borrowers’ aggregate willingness to
pay for loans (indicated by the demand curve) and
the amount that they actually pay. Similarly, the
surplus of the depositors is equal to the difference
between the amount of interest they receive and
the amount of interest they are willing to accept,
which is reflected in the deposit supply curve.
This surplus is the area between the supply curve
and the optimal deposit rate, q0 (triangle BCE).
Figure 2 compares two credit unions with the
same number of depositors (the same deposit sup-
ply curve) but with different numbers of borrow-
ers. The credit union with the higher number of
borrowers (and thus the higher borrower-to-
member ratio) has a deposit and loan rate equal to
q1, compared with the lower value q0, which is the
rate of the credit union with the smaller borrower-
to-member ratio.5 This simple analysis leads to
our first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Sponsor Control. The deposit
rate strictly increases as the number of members
who are borrowers increases. 
A later section discusses our strategy for test-
ing this hypothesis.
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Sponsor Control: Number of Borrowers
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5 The demand curve rotates upward—rather than tracing out a paral-
lel upward shift—because each individual borrower’s willingness to
pay is identical and the credit union’s aggregate demand curve rep-
resents a horizontal summation of individual loan demands.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST.L OUIS
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Member Control
Member control of a cooperative firm
inevitably leads to conflicts of interest if there is
more than one type of member. Control of
decision-making determines how much surplus
the credit union will generate and how this sur-
plus will be distributed among the members. The
key difference between a member-controlled
credit union and one that is controlled by a spon-
sor is that, in the former case, the dominant
member group will act like a monopoly with
respect to minority members. The latter will act
like a “benevolent dictator,” resulting in the com-
petitive market outcome.
Depositor Control. If depositors are in control






The quantity to be maximized is the area
above the deposit-supply curve, which is deter-
mined by the choice of the deposit rate, q.
Constraint (2b) sets out the credit union’s zero-
profit constraint and reflects the fact that inter-
bank borrowing or lending is used to offset imbal-
ances in the amount of loanable funds demanded
and supplied by members at the chosen interest
rates. Constraint (2c) excludes profitable roundtrip
transactions in which members finance high-rate
deposits by borrowing low-rate funds from the
credit union.
Solving the maximization problem shown
above, the optimal deposit rate, q*, and the opti-
mal loan rate, p*, are as follows6:
(3a)
(3b)
Equation (3a) shows that, if we compare two
credit unions that differ in the number of borrow-
ers (i.e., in the demand parameter b) but are other-
wise comparable, the credit union with the higher
number of borrowers (lower value of b) has the
higher deposit rate, q*. This reflects the fact that
with a higher borrower-to-member ratio there are
more minority members who can be “exploited”
in terms of high loan rates, which, in turn, allows
the credit union to pay higher deposit rates. A
depositor-controlled credit union chooses the
monopoly loan rate, p*, and pays q* on deposits,
producing surplus for depositors. The credit union
has excess deposits, in the amount y(q*)–   x(p*),
which are lent in the interbank market. In effect,
the monopoly profit obtained through lending the
amount x(p*) is distributed to depositors in the
form of deposit rates that are higher than inter-
bank rates. Note that the loan rate changes in
response to changes in the membership structure
only if control of the credit union also switches
from depositors to borrowers.
Borrower Control. Borrowers will control the
credit union if they constitute a large enough frac-
tion of the membership. Under borrower control,






In this case, the quantity to be maximized is
the area below the loan demand curve, which is
determined by the choice of the loan rate, p. The
optimal deposit rate, q*, and the optimal loan rate,
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The solution represents a minimum in the depositors’ surplus. We
assume the solution is interior (constraint (2c) is not binding).








The solution represents a minimum in the borrowers’ surplus.
Again, we assume p < q.In a way analogous to the case considered
above in which the loan rate was invariant, the
deposit rate is unaffected by changes in the num-
ber of borrowers (represented by variations in the
loan demand parameter, b). Holding all else equal,
the optimal loan rate increases with the number of
borrowers because progressively more borrowers
must share the surplus generated by low-priced
deposits. A borrower-controlled credit union sets a
relatively low lending rate, p*, and attracts more
loan demand, x(p*), than there is deposit supply,
y(q*). The shortfall in deposit funding is met by
borrowing in the interbank market at rate r. In
effect, the monopsony profits earned by the
credit union on deposits collected at rate q* are
distributed to borrowers in the form of a below-
interbank market lending rate of p*. In this case it
is the deposit rate that is insensitive to small
changes in the membership structure as long as
these changes do not transfer control away from
borrowers.
Implications of Member Control. When com-
bining the two variations on the theme of member
control, two features are noteworthy. First, the
deposit rate is greater throughout the depositor-
dominated regime than it is anywhere in the
borrower-dominated regime. This makes intuitive
sense because depositors who exercise control
over the credit union will capitalize on this fact
and pay themselves a higher deposit rate. Second,
the fact that control must shift from depositors to
borrowers at some point as the percentage of bor-
rowers in the membership increases implies that
there is a discontinuity in the schedule of optimal
deposit rates. Figure 3 displays these two features,
where β is the fraction of members who are bor-
rowers. The results of our analysis of the case of
member control lead us to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Member Control. The deposit
rate strictly increases as the number of borrowers
increases if a credit union is under depositor control.
The deposit rate is constant and takes on its global
minimum value if a credit union is under borrower
control.
Market Control
Thus far, we have focused only on the internal
control features of occupational credit unions. It is
clear, however, that external factors may constrain
the ability of a controlling group of credit union
members to extract surplus. If price competition is
strong in local deposit or loan markets, minority
members may threaten to leave the credit union to
improve the terms they receive. This leads to our
third testable hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: Market Control. Deposit rates are
independent of credit-union membership structure
(the fraction of members who are borrowers).
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
We use the loan-to-member ratio as a proxy
for the borrower-to-member ratio. Our sample
includes occupational credit unions with
loan-to-member ratios so low that depositors
almost certainly are in the majority. The sample
also contains credit unions in which the loan-
to-member ratio is so high that a borrower majori-
ty appears inevitable. Given the wide range of
membership structures that we observe and our
model’s predictions, a deposit rate that strictly
increases as the loan-to-member ratio increases
would support Hypothesis 1, namely, sponsor con-
trol of occupational credit unions. A deposit rate
that initially increases, drops discontinuously, and
then remains constant as the loan-to-member ratio
increases would support Hypothesis 2, namely,
member control. A pattern of deposit rates that is
completely unrelated to the loan-to-member ratio
would support Hypothesis 3, namely, market con-
trol. Note that these qualitative predictions about
the dataset do not require us to identify which
credit unions are depositor-controlled and which
are borrower-controlled (if any).
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We use a semi-parametric estimation method
to address the possibility that the deposit rate is
nonlinear in the loan-to-member ratio (as indeed
it appears to be). This ratio is included in the
nonparametric part of the regression along with a
constant regressor, whereas the parametric part of
the regression contains a set of normalizing
regressors. The normalizing regressors are four
zero-one indicator variables that represent the
type of membership (TOM) categories shown in
Table 1, with educational credit unions serving as
the numeraire unit (the excluded category). The
nonparametric methodology allows the relation-
ship between the deposit rate and the loan-to-
member ratio to take on a (smooth) functional
form. The assumption of a smooth relationship
between the loan-to-member ratio and the deposit
rate is not restrictive if the relationship between
the loan-to-member ratio and the borrower-
to-depositor ratio is stochastic. For example, the
number of loans per borrower might not be the
same for all credit unions in the sample. For
details on the econometric methodology, see the
Appendix.
We examine a subset of all federally chartered
and federally insured occupational credit unions
that reported financial information at the end of
1997 (see the Appendix for details on construction
of the dataset and the variables used). Table 1 pro-
vides a breakdown of our sample according to the
type of membership group characterizing each
credit union. The Table distinguishes between
credit unions with a single common bond and
those with multiple common bonds. Overall, 2,211
credit unions in our sample had a single common
bond (43 percent of the sample), whereas 2,923
credit unions (57 percent of the sample) had mul-
tiple common bonds among their membership.
Membership Structure and
Deposit Rates
The estimated relationship between deposit
rates and the loan-to-member ratio in our sample
is displayed in Figure 4 by the solid line.In
essence, the figure depicts the expected deposit
rate (vertical axis) for an occupational credit union
with a given loan-to-member ratio (horizontal
axis). Ninety percent confidence intervals for the
point estimates are shown as dashed lines.8
Table 1
Distribution of Credit Unions by Type of Membership
Descriptive Statistics
Minimum Median Mean Maximum Standard deviation
Deposit rate 0.004 0.038 0.038 0.089 0.008
Loan-to-member ratio 0.009 0.447 0.471 1.859 0.177
Herfindahl index 0.053 0.208 0.208 1 0.095
Table 2
Table 1
Distribution of Credit Unions by Type of Membership
Distribution of Credit Unions by Type of Membership
Type of membership (TOM)
Educational
Military

























8  For econometric reasons we discarded 627 observations with zero
values for the deposit rates. We also discarded 55 observations of
loan-to-member ratios greater than 2 because these seemed to be
aberrations or reporting errors. For instance, one credit union
reported a ratio of loans to members that equaled 365.48 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2001
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Figure 4 indicates a positive association
between the loan-to-member ratio and credit
union deposit rates over the bulk of observed
loan-to-member ratios. The intercept is not identi-
fied in regressions of this type, so only vertical
distances in the figure are meaningful (not the
level itself). The tight confidence intervals over the
central region in the figure (where the overwhelm-
ing number of credit-union observations lie) imply
that the slope of the relationship is reliably posi-
tive. Confidence intervals widen dramatically and
the point estimates appear erratic at extreme val-
ues of the loan-to-member ratio because there are
very few observations in those ranges. Figure 4
therefore provides visual evidence to support the
sponsor-control hypothesis of occupational credit
unions. That is, it does not appear that member
control switches from depositors to borrowers as
the loan-to-member ratio increases in the
cross-section of credit unions. Nor does it appear
that loan-to-member ratios and deposit rates are
completely unrelated, as the market-control
hypothesis requires. Instead, the upward-sloping
relationship is consistent with the sponsor-control
regime where the membership structure and
deposit rates are related because deposits are an
important marginal source of funding for loans.9
Table 3 displays the coefficients from the para-
metric part of our semi-parametric regression
equation. As mentioned above, the regressors are
zero-one indicator variables that represent the
type of membership with educational credit
unions serving as the numeraire unit. The signifi-
cant coefficients on TOM codes indicate that there
are variations in the ability or willingness of occu-
pational credit unions to pay higher deposit rates
among different types of sponsors.
CONCLUSIONS
This article seeks to answer the question of
how occupational credit unions set deposit rates.
We investigate three potential control regimes
under which occupational credit union deposit
rates might be set, namely, member control, spon-
sor control, and market control.
If members control occupational credit
unions, we would expect a positive relationship
between the extent of loan demand and the
deposit rate, conditional on depositor control of
the credit union. If borrowers are in control, how-
ever, we expect the deposit rate to take on a value
that is lower than what we would observe in the
depositor-dominated regime; also, conditional on
borrower control, we expect the deposit rate to be
independent of the membership structure. Thus,
the member-control hypothesis implies that, in a
cross-sectional snapshot of many different credit
unions, the deposit rate would be higher whenev-
er the borrower-to-member ratio is higher so long
as depositors are in control. For sufficiently high
values of the borrower-to-member ratio, however,
borrowers would be in the majority. For these
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9 We experimented with other empirical specifications including one
in which a county-level Herfindahl index was used as a condition-
ing variable to represent the intensity of deposit-market competi-
tion. Details on the construction of this variable are in the
Appendix. This variable was never significant, however, so we do
not report results from models in which it was used. 
Parametric Variables from the
Semi-Parametric Regression
Type of membership
(TOM) codes Coefficient  t-Statistic
Military 2.385 × 10-2 1.795*
Government 2.087 ×  10-2 2.239**
Manufacturing 4.560  × 10-2 5.053***
Services 4.178 × 10-2 4.480***
Number of 5,134
observations
*/**/*** Significant at 10/5/1 percent levels (two-tailed tests).
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credit unions, the deposit rate would take on its
minimum value in the sample and would be com-
pletely independent of the membership structure.
The sponsor-control hypothesis of occupation-
al credit unions, by way of contrast, predicts that
deposit rates would be higher, the greater the pro-
portion of borrowers in the membership. This is
because deposits are an important marginal
source of funds for meeting loan demand, and
higher deposit rates are necessary to attract addi-
tional loanable funds.
Finally, the market-control hypothesis suggests
that occupational credit union deposit rates and
the loan-to-member ratios should be completely
unrelated. Local competition would dictate deposit
rates and there would be no statistical relationship
between membership structure and deposit rates
whatsoever.
Using data from a large sample of occupation-
al credit unions observed at the end of 1997, we
find that deposit rates are positively associated
with a measure of the credit union’s loan demand
throughout most of the range of observed
loan-to-member ratios. This finding is consistent
with the sponsor-control hypothesis of occupa-
tional credit unions but not with the member-
control or the market-control hypothesis. This
result supports the theoretical approach taken in
Emmons and Schmid (1999a), where effective
sponsor control of occupational credit unions was
assumed.
Thus, it appears that Hansmann’s (1996) sug-
gestion—that employers sponsor and operate
occupational credit unions to provide surplus to
all of their employees—is a better description in
practice than the view that they are subject to cap-
ture by a subset of members or that local competi-
tion dictates credit union rates completely.
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DATASET AND VARIABLES
The Dataset
We analyze a dataset comprising all federally
chartered and federally insured credit unions at
the end of 1997. The dataset was obtained from
the Report of Condition and Income for Credit
Unions (NCUA 5300, 5300S) and produced by the
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National Credit Union Administration (NCUA).
These reports are issued semi-annually in June
and December. We used the December data. The
flows in the December income statements include
the entire year of 1997.
We concentrate on the following types of
membership (TOM) groups among occupationally
based credit unions: educational; military; federal,
state, and local government; manufacturing; and
services. Thus, we do not include community
credit unions, associational credit unions, or cor-
porate credit unions. Lists of TOM classification
codes are from the NCUA (Instruction No. 6010.2,
July 28, 1995).
We excluded observations for any of the fol-
lowing reasons:
• Missing TOM codes.
• Activity codes other than “active.”
• Number of members or potential mem-
bers not greater than one (applies to actual
and to lagged values).
• Number of loans to members equal to zero
(applies to actual and to lagged values).
• Ratio of lagged number of loans to lagged 
number of members greater than two.
• Nonpositive values for total assets or 
lagged total assets.
• Dividend on shares equal to zero.
We calculated county-specific Herfindahl
indexes as measures of concentration of the local
banking market. A Herfindahl index is defined as
the sum of squared market shares. We measured
market shares as the fraction of total
commercial-bank and Bank Insurance Fund
(BIF)-insured thrift deposits (as of June 30) within
a county (or independent city) based on FDIC
Summary of Deposits data. These data are avail-
able online at <http://www2.fdic.gov/sod/>. Table
2 provides an overview of the dataset.
Definition of Variables
Definitions of variables and underlying data
sources are listed below. Relevant item numbers
are in brackets for data taken from the Report of
Condition and Income for Credit Unions, produced
by the National Credit Union Administration.
Dependent Variable. Deposit rate: Natural log-
arithm of the ratio of dividends on shares
[CUSA6091] and total shares and deposits
[CUSA6091]. We use the natural logarithm because
the deposit rate has a lower bound at zero.
Independent Variables
1. Loan-to-member ratio: Number of loans to
members divided by number of members. The
number of loans to members was obtained as
the difference between the number of total
loans [CUSA1262] and the number of loans
that were purchased or extended to
non-members [CUSA1205]. The loan-to-
member ratio was lagged by one year.
2. TOM code variables: Equal to one if the credit
union is of a specific type (military, govern-
ment, manufacturing, or services). Because we
use an intercept in the nonparametric part of
the semi-parametric regression, the TOM code
variable for the educational credit union was
dropped.
3. Herfindahl index: Sum of squared market
shares of total commercial-bank and
BIF-insured thrift deposits. By definition, the
Herfindahl index is greater than zero; its maxi-
mum value is one. The Herfindahl index was
lagged by one year. Results using the
Herfindahl index are not reported in the text;
see footnote 7.
Econometric Method
We use a semi-parametric model to allow the
influence of the loan-to-member ratio on the
dependent variable to be nonlinear. The parame-
tric part of the model contains zero-one variables
that indicate the TOM code. In particular, we use a
semi-parametric model of a credit union’s partici-
pation rate of the form:
where yi is the ith observation of the dependent
variable; xi is a vector consisting of the ith observa-
tion of the explanatory variables in the nonpara-
metric part of the model, the loan-to-member
ratio, and (in unreported versions of the model)
the Herfindahl index; xpi is a row vector consisting
of the ith observation of the explanatory variables
of the linear (parametric) part of the model; β pis a
column vector of the parameters of the linear part
of the model; and ε iis the ith realization of the
error term. For details on this econometric
approach, see the Appendix in Emmons and
Schmid (1999a).
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